Monetary flexibility in dependent economies by Gaskin, M.
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribuiion-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs 3.0 Licence, 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecommons.0rg/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, NAIROBI. 
Discussion Paper No, 10 
MONETARY FLEXIBILITY IN DEPENDENT ECONOMIES 
M. Gaskin 
May, 1965 
Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not 
be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Institute for Development Stud, 
or of the University College, Nairobi. 
Monetary , Erexibility in Dependent Economies^ 
The present curre.ncy board system in East Africa will 
clearly give way, either Toy evolution or by more rapid change, 
to some form of central banking system. What form this 
system will take is. an issue still in doubt. All sorts of 
variations on the themes of. centralisation and decentralisation 
have been suggested and are possible. The final choice will 
be decided at least as much by political as by economic 
factors. In this paper I do not. propose to comment directly 
on the form that central banking institutions should take. 
Instead I shall discuss a number of closely related issues 
which bear on the scojje of central banking action in East 
Africa. I shall assume that the common currency will be main-
tained but this is not essential to any of my arguments which 
would apply, mutatis mutandis, to each territory separatly 
should the decision be taken to break up the currency area. 
The questionsthat I shall consider are theses-
1. Credit creation and the fiduciary issue 
2. Monetary 'flexibility and the fiduciary issue 
3.• Monetary flexibility and economic growth 
4.• Money supply and external reserves. 
1. Credit Creation and the Fiduciary Issue 
Walter Newlyn, reviewing the functions of a central bank 
gives as his first two "Currency issue11- and-"credit creation", 
and he indicates that, in the light of the territories' needs 
and the way these functions are performed at present, the 
2 
time is ripe for a central bank in East Africa. What does 
he mean by "credit creation"? At one point early in his 
article he appears to. equate credit creation with the circu-
lation of curency on a fiduciary basis,J At other points, 
and notably in the mathematical appendix .to his: article, it is 
clear that he does not make this identification. But as it 
also appears in the wording of the reports, of the East Africa A 
Board it is worthwhile considering the relation between 
credit creation and the fiduciary issue. 
"^An early version of this paper was presented at' the Annual 
Conference of.the East African Institute for Social Research, 
Makerere College, December 1964. In revising it I have bene-
fited from the discussion at the Conference. 
^"Monetary Systems and Intergration", The East African Economic 
Review, June 1964, p. 47. 
3Ibid, p. 47. 4see, e.g. Report, 1963, p. 12. 
The terra 'credit creation' suggests a process of monetary 
expansion., The 'credit' normally referred to here is bank 
credits it is created as the result of an increase in bank lend-
ing which, in turn, is usually cnnsidered as leading to an 
increase in the'" volume of " net bank liabilities - whether bank-
notes or deposits or both - outstanding. As banking liabilities 
notes and deposits, make up the money stock, the term 'credit 
creation' usually implies an increase in the supply of money. 
The first point I wish to examine is how far an increase in 
the fiduciary issue of. East Africa, is likely to lead to an 
increase in the money supply under present conditions. 
The East African Currency Soard has the power to issue 
notes on a fiduciary basis either against securities of the 
East African governments or against crop finance paper 
(rediscounted by the banks). The present fiduciary limits are 
£35 millions against government securities and £10 millions 
for crop finance. At June 30, 1964, the composition of the 
domestic securities held by the Board was as follows 
Domestic Securities held by the E.A.C.B. 30th June, 1964. 
£ millions 
Treasury bills 3.83 
Crop finance advances 0.75 
Short-dated (1-5 years) 1.12 
Medium-dated (6-10 years) 2.17 
Long-dated (over 10 years) 6.43 
14.30 
Total assets (including • 
external assets) 75.88 
Sources Report of E.A.C.B., 1964. pp,42, 50, 
I propose to exclude from consideration here increases in 
the fiduciary issue in response to such temporary needs as the 
seasonal requirements of government and crop finance, and to 
confine the analysis to the use of the fiduciary issue as a 
source of more permanent finance, in the interest of long-run 
development policy. The possible trains of events following 
an increase in the fiduciary issue will be illustrated in the 
following four examples. 
(i) First, let us assume that the Currency Board agrees to 
make £10 millions of finance available to the East African 
•governments, to finance part of their development plans. One 
way in which this.operation might be carried out is for the 
Board to subscribe to new securities issued by the' governments 
by the tender of sterling which the Board:acquires by liqui-
dating some of its external assets. • 
This might be done where the governments needed foreign 
exchange to cover their overseas disbursements in connection 
with the plan expenditures. Leaving aside, for the time being, 
the question of any concurrent domestic expenditures, what 
would be effects of this particular transaction? For the 
Currency Board it would amount to a straight substitution 
of internal for external securities. For the economy of . 
East Africa there would have been a substitution of real assets 
for foreign exchange assets. The domestic monetary situation 
however would be exactly as it was before - except that part 
of the currency circulation which before was 'non-fiduciary' 
i.e. backed by external assets, would now be designated 'fidu-
ciary, but the size of the monej?" stock would be unchanged. To 
describe this particular expansion of the fiduciary issue as 
'credit creation' is clearly misleading. 'Credit diversion' 
would be a more, appropriate descriptions part of that fund 
of saving which is congealed in the monetary circulation has 
been withdrawn from one kind of externallly - acquired asset, 
foreign exchange, and reinvested in another, imported 
equipment. 
How realistic is this example? Would the governments in 
fact wish to take Currency Board finance in this form? The 
answer is that this is indeed not the typical way in which 
the Board provides such finance at present. But it is always 
open to the governments to draw on their share of fiduciary 
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issue finance in this form and one East African government 
does do so. Furthermore, as the pace of development under 
the published plans accelerates, foreign exchange needs will 
grow and this kind of direct drawing on the fc isign exchange 
assets of the Board will probably increase. 
It is the case, howe#er, that at present the typical 
method by which an East African government obtains finance, 
within its 'fiduciary quota', runs along lines which, formally 
at any rate, differ from this first example. The normal 
procedure is for the credit^ in the Board's books, to the 
clearing account of the government's banking agent. At one 
time the sale was effected by a straight transfer of notes to 
the government concerned; but since the institution of 
clearing accounts, held by the commercial banks with the Board 
the initial step has taken' the form of a credit. This intro-
duces our second example. 
j -ix ..is open to them to " take any of their receipts from the 
Board in this form - e.g. their shares of the Board's operatin 
surplus.Also, the gold or convertible currency elements in the 
subscriptions of the three countries to the I.M.F., the I.B.R.-
and. other international institutions Eire being met by the Cur-
rency Board out of its surplus reserves; see Report o£ jfc^e E.Ai 
II $ 
(ii)Here- we assume that, as before, the governments wish to 
raise £10 millions of finance from the Currency Board5 but in 
this case the money is required for internal expenditure. 'The 
primary effect of the transaction is that the Board's assets 
increase by the domestic securities acquired, while its liabi-
lities, in the form of deposits in clearing accounts, rise by 
an equal amount. The bankers to the various governments will 
credit clients'- accounts with the acquired, and their own assets 
will rise by the increase in their clearing balances. Now the 
commercial banks of East Africa, while they mantain these clear-
ing accounts with the B oard, do not normally keep large 
c 
balances in them. The probability is therefore that unless 
the money is spent very quickly, the banks will convert their 
balances with the Board into sterling which they will place, 
at interest, in London. The Board's sterling assets will there-
fore decline, pari passu, with their deposit liabilities. 
The borrowing governments now proceed to spend the funds 
on domestic projects. This will cause an increase in money 
incomes and expenditures in East Africa and the currency needs 
of the public will increase. The commercial banks will have 
to meet this need by surrendering sterling to the Board in 
return for notes. But this sterling will, so to speak, 'come 
out of the sterling assets acquired by the governments' bankers 
when the Board subscribed for the securities. (With the 
expenditure of the funds by the governments this sterling will 
have been,spread among all the banks in the system as balances 
are transferred through the clearing). The result upto this 
point will be, a rise in the currency circulation of the Board 
which, for the time being, we will assume equals the original 
transfer of finance to the governments. 
But what of the further effects of the governments' spend-
ing? These will depend very much on the propensity of 
East Africans to buy imported goods5 on the existence or 
otherwise of spare capacity in the economy; and on the propensity 7 
of the public to save. If this finance is extended and spent 
in a situation where the supply of domestic goods is completely 
inelastic then (ignoring effects both on domestic prices and 
on the supply of exports) the propensity to import will rise 
to unity and an amount of emports equal to the expenditures 
will be fairly Prompt37 sucked in. These imports will 
^Between mid-1962 and mid-1964 total balances of all banks 
fluctuated between £0.5 millions and £3.5 millions'; See Report 
of the E.AC.B., 1964, p. 17. 
am looking at these propensities in aggregative terms only. 
The actual values of the propensities to import and to save 
may vary considerably according to the detailed distribution 
of the initial expenditures. 
be paid for, in the fin0"1, analysis, with the sterling which 
the East African commercial banks originally acquired as the 
result of .the Currency Boards subscription for the domestic 
securities. At the same time there will be an accompanying 
reduction in the currency circulation as the public spends i 
its increased holdings of currency on imported goods. The 
final outcome will be exactly as in the first edamplei-
there will be a substitution of real assets for foreign 
exchange, assets with no increase in the money supply. Again, 
an example of 'credit diversion1. 
(iii) For our third case let us assume that initially every-
thing happens as in the last example, but that the supply of 
domestic goods and services is capable of expansion. In 
this example we will assume that no part of any increase in 
income is saved, but that part of income is spent on imported 
goods. In this situation expenditure of their acquired funds 
by the governments Will lead to some increase in real output 
in East Africa. Just how far this will go will depend on the 
size of the propensity to import. If people normally spend 
a high proportion of their incomes on imported goods then 
the expansive effects of the governments' expenditures, on real 
output, will be heavily damped. If the propensity to import 
is low the effect on domestic output will be correspondingly 
greater. But low or high the fact that a proportion of 
expenditure out of income is on imports will cause a loss of 
foreign exchange and a concomitant drop in money supply.. 
Furthermore, provided no new saving is being performed,, the 
induced imports will in the end equal the initial governmental 
expenditures, foreign exchange assets will decrease by this 
amountand the money supply will subside to its original level 
The monetary .outcome, in this case-, is exactly as before; the 
currency circulation will be the same as it was at the outset, 
but a larger amount of it will be fiduciary. In real terms 
there will have, been a substitution of real assets (the induced 
imports) for foreign.exchange assets, but there will also 
have been something else. The expenditures by the governments 
will have induced some rise in domestic output, so that the 
total increase in the real assets available to the economy will 
have exceeded the decline in foreign exchange assets. In this 
case, while there has been no permanent increase in the money 
supply there has been a temporary 'creation of credit' which 
has produced an .addition to real assets. 
8 ,. • 
See J. J. Polak? "Monetary Analysis of Income Formation and 
Payments Problems," I.M.F.- Staff Papers, Vol. VI (1957-1958) 
pp. 1-50 
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(iv) Finally let us -assume not only that domestic supply can 
increase in the face of higher expenditure, but also that some 
part.of incomes is spent on imported (roods, and this results in 
a decline in the money stock and a drain on foreign exchange 
assets. But the incidence of saving may prevent this going as 
far as in the previous example. The outcome depends on the 
form in which the saved income is held. If the income on being 
saved.is lent through the capital market or through financial 
institutions, other than the commercial banks, so that it re-
enters the expenditure stream, then the final outcome is the 
same as in example (iii)^. If however, the saved.income is 
held either in currency or in commercial bank balances there 
will be e somewhat different outcome. 
To the extent that the process of expenditure and income 
generation, set off by the irfcial governmental expenditures, 
results in a higher holding of currency by the East African 
public, the volume of currency in circulation will remain above 
its original figure,and the sterling assets of the Currency Board 
will decline by something less that the original increase in the 
fiduciary issue. If the size of this original increase in the 
fiduciary issue was decided in the expectation, and with the 
intention, that it would eventually produce an equal reduction 
in external assets then clearly a further extension of fiduciary 
finance will now be possible. In this case there has been a 
creation of credit with more permanent effects in the shape of 
a higher fund of saving permanently available. 
If now we assume that part of the saving out of the higher 
income is plac&d in deposits with the commercial banks, yet 
another possioility is introduced. The effect of this (ignoring 
many intermediate details will be^increase "the liquid assets 
of the commercial banks: in the practical context of East African 
banking short-term assets in London will increase. There has 
been no evidence in recent years that the banks aim at any con-
stant ratio between their liquid assets and their local deposit 
liabilities, but we will assume that an increase in their liquid 
assets does in fact make them willing to expand, their lending 
in East Africa and that suitable borrowers present themselves. 
i 
The expansion of bank credit which will result from this 
increase In lending will finance a further series of expenditure 
and generate more income; and as before, if the supply of domestic 
goods and services can accomodate this further increase in effect-
ive demand, there will be a rise in domestic real output. But 
the increased expenditures from this source will have the effect 
of inducing a 
^ 'This jfEalssis leans on A.1I. Jvlacleod, "Credit Expansion in an ope: Economy'^, Economic Hournal, September 1962, pp. 561-4-0. 
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further.-increment, of. imports and . this will cause a drain :.o£ :if oreign 
exchage assets both from the banks and from the Currency Board. 
(There will also be some transfer of sterling assets from the banks 
to the Board since the currency holdings.of .the public will probably 
rise following the expansion of bank credit). If the banks adjust 
their lending correctly they will be able to reach a new position 
of equalibrium in which their loans, liquid assets and deposits 
are all at a higher level than before. 
This final «srariant of case (iv) points to another qualification 
of the identfication of 'credit creation' with an increase in the 
fiduciary note issue. In this case there is credit creation 
leading to an expansion of real output. But part of the credit 
created is commercial bank credit and this is not normally made 
available to the governments for financing their own expenditures, 
except to a minor extent. If the governments wish to secure the 
financial benefit of all the credit created as a result of the . 
extension of the fiduciary issue they must take steps to ensure 
that the increased lending power of the commercial banks, consequent 
on the increase in their liquid assets', is used to acquire public 
securities. • 
2. Monetary Flexibity and the Fiduciary Issue 
In recent discussion of the central bank question'in East Africa 
there•is a tendency to equate flexibility in the money supply with 
an enlarged fiduciary element within the currency issue. This is 
a technical question, but it is worth examining it.before we go on, 
in.the next section, to consider the larger questions of monetary 
elasticity. 
There are. two preliminary points to make. Flexibility in the 
currency Is indeed.a precondition of elasticity in the total money 
supply. Even where currency is a subsidiary medium of exchange 
it is normally demanded in a stable ratio to -the dominant medium, 
bank .dbpo.sits; thus an appreciable rise in money supply is only 
possible if the currency component can increase. Secondly, it may 
be remarked that the present system of currency issue in East 
Africa does possess flexibility Of a kind. The currency can increase. 
Such an increase requires an accretion of sterling assets by 
East Africa as a whole and thiS> depends on a favourable balance of 
payments. But in an export-based economy such a favourable external 
balance tends to occur naturally as people accumulate currency 
balances. However, the ... 
TOc.f. J..7.0. Olakanpo, "Monetary Management in Dependent Economies," 
Economica, November. 1961, p. 397. 
11 I am assuming in both variants of case "(iv) that the increased 
holdings of currency and bank deposits are treated as 'true sav-
ings by the public, and do not induce any rise in expenditures.ToTo 
the extent that increased holdings of monetary assets induce the 
public to spend more, there will be a further drain of external 
assets, and a concomitant decline in money supply. The situation 
will then approximate to the end result of example (iii) above. 
point to note here is that when people argue, as they do, for 
greater flexibility in the currency Issue they are arguing for a 
loosening df the link between money and supply and the external 
balance. Just how far a dependent economy can loosen this link is 
a question to' which we retxirn later. 
Turning now to the mechanism of fiduciary issue it needs to be 
sg.id that- in itself this system of issue is not necessarily a source 
of flexibility. The original pattern of all fiduciary issues, that 
given to--the. Bank of England in 1844-, formed part of a system which 
was specifically designed to exclude flexibility in the currency, 
other th^n that permitted by the external, balance. The system then . 
established .embodied a fixed fiduciary limit, with power to issue 
currency, in excess of the limit, one-for-one, agpinst gold. In 
principle -this is exactly the system now in force in East Africa.: 
the Currency Board may Issue currency up to £35 million against 
domestic securities (plus £10 millions of cfop finance); but beyond 
that its notes must be backed, one-for-one, by external assets. 
When such a system is altered to the extent of allowing a once-
fo-all increase in the fiduciary limit, there is an acess of flexi-
bility, but it may be no more than temporary. Should the needs of 
public finance drive the Board upto its limit - the position would 
revert to what it was before: increases in the currency would accom-
pany an accretion of external assets. ./hat is required, of course, 
is an arrangement whereby the fiduciary limit itself may be reviewed 
or exceeded In particular circumstances. Such arrangements are 
possible and do indeed exist. But once scope for flexibility is 
admitted other problems arise. There is a conflict between flexibi-
lity and the maintanance of statutory restraints on the monetary 
authority. The-point of any limitation on the fiduciary issue is 
to cricumscribe the power of the monetary authorities in some degree:-
by allowing them to vary the 'issue, the strength of the restraint 
is inevitably diminished. It is comparatively easy to legislate.: 
for semi-automatic increases in the fiduciary issue - say, a rise. ^  
of so much -per year - but this is not the only kind of flexibility 
that is required. A true central bank needs some measure of short-
run elasticity and this is more difficult to combine with statutory 
12 
restraints. The question may well, of course, be asked: why 
link the currency to the external reserve at all? This is $ pertinent 
issue to which we return later; but however, it is answered - it does 
not dispose, of.the .problem of statutory restraints on the.monetary . authority. 
12 - The East African Currency Board does function'as a lender of last 
resort' in that it stands ready at all times to rediscount 
East African Treasury Bills. It has been able to do this without 
running into any problems over its fiduciary limit since it has 
hitherto operated well within this limit. • 
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p. Monetary Flexibility and Economic Growth 
A monetary system serving an economy of any degree of commercial 
development requires some elasticity in the total supply of money, 
as well as in its various components. In a dependent enonomy the 
jiij.plos"t type of. elasticity is that, needed to meet seasonality in. 
the inflow of income. ^here hard currency is the major means., of 
payment the need is for .a currency that can expand as the crop s 
-season reaches its climax in the harvesting and movement of produce" 
The currency board system would appear to be well adapted. to provide 
this kind of flexibility since the exportation of the crop automa-
tically provides the-foreign exchange against which of the currency 
is, issued. As incomes are spent, the 100 per cent backing of 
external assets ensures that the-high expenditure on imported goods 
is automatically covered by foreign exchange. 
But the adaptation is only partial. The fact is that crops must 
be paid for, and the circulation expanded, in advance of actual 
exportation and therefore in advance of foreign exchange receipts. 
The system has depended therefore, in the past, on a seasonal 
importation of funds by expatriate trading companies and'banks'. 
These funds have provided both the short-period finance needed for 
the moving the crops and the sterling assets required to expand the 
currency in advance of export. receipts. Furthermore-where bank 
deposits are a significant element in the monetary systems a 
currency board which possess no more than the traditional powers 
of such a body contributes nothing to their flexibility; this... 
again must depend on expartriate banks with: reserves held outside 
the country. However, following the recent extension of its powers 
and functions the- East African Currency Board is in a position to 
meet these needs: its £10 millions of fiduciary issue for crop 
finance may be employed either to increase the currency circulation 
or to reinforce the liquid assets of the commercial banks, at the 
time of crop movement. 
Another type of flexibility is that involved in a central 
bank's function as- lender of last resort. In the-more extreme cases 
In which the need for this arises - situations of financial crisis 
and panic - what is needed is the ability Indefinitely to substitute 
acceptible claims on the monetary authority for temporary unaccept-
able claims on other transactors. This clearly demands some kind 
of emergency arrangements to expand the money supply, arragements 
which pose technical problem and which1 raise issues of statutory 
control, but which we defer to the next section. 
15c.f. P.T. Bauer, "West African Trade",.. (London,- 1954-), p. 203. 
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Th.ird.ly in p growigag economy there is a need for secular or 
long-term, elasticity in the money supply. As income rise and the 
volume of money transactions increases there is a rising demand"for 
money. If this is not met, there will "be a deflationary drag on the 
14 15 economy. Mr. G.' Lomoro and Professor Paul Clark propose to turn 
this phenomenon into a positive-advantage, as- a source of finance, 
to the governments of East Africa. Their thesis, which I shall call 
Lomoro-Clark thesis, is that by a. given date, 1970, a certain 
possible expansion of the national Income may be postulated, on the 
assumption of particular rates of growth of the East African economy. 
They then argue that, on the basis of past ratios between the growth 
of income and various componenets of fehe money stock, we can credit 
how much growth in the money stock will be' required, by 1^70. in 
order to avoid deflationary effects. Finally, it is claimed, econo-
mic expansion will be positively assisted if the money stock is- "•-•11 
actually caused to grwo. by the predicted amount. This final step 
in the.argument it linked to a further thesis of Professor Clark 
that the main block to expansion in East Africa lies not in a short-
age of .saving, or foreign exchange, or trained manpower, but of. . 
16 
public finance. The expansion of the money supply is thus seen 
as necessary to avoid a .deflationary drag on development and also 
as a vital cource of funds for government. 
At the outset may I say that I do not dispute the point of 
departure of this argument: demand for money does grow with the • 
national income, and this provides a fund of saving which may and 
indeed should be tapped. However, there are two aspects of the 
Lomoro-Clarke model on which I wish to comment. The first concerns 
factors making for variability in; the equilibrium relationship 
between the money stock and the national income. Professor Clark 
17 
notes that the rate of turnover the money stock is an important 
variable in the monetary situation: a given volume of monetary 
transactions may be carried on either by a larger amount of money 
or a higher raie of turnover of money. But one gains the impression 
that Clark regards the velocity of circulation as a more or less 
dependent variable which, given the money stock, adapts itself -
perhaps incompletely - to the needs of the economy. Personally 
t am rather doubtful of the : existence of an adaptive mechanism invol-
ving a more rapid movement of money in the transactions circuit, 
but this is not.;t.he point that. I wish to stress here. What I 
would maintain is that the velocity of circulation can behave as 
an independent variable and that, as an economy develops, changes 
in the financial structure tend naturally to produce changes in it. 
The relevant changes are the growth of non-bank: financial intermediaries and 
14 "Monetary Expansion in East African Development", E.D.R.P. No. 48, 
15 "The PiOle of an East African Central Bank in Accelerating • -
Development", E.D.R.P. No. 46. 
16 Paul G, Clark, "Foreign Aid, Domestic Finance and the Develop-
ment plan", paper prepared for the University of East African 
Conference on Foreign Aid, Dar-es-Salaam, September 1964. This paper 
-Ln„m-, is-oin the Makerere,series as E.D.ILP.IJ, 45. , , . -"-/"The Role of an East African Central Bank in Accelerating 
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the development of the. capital market. These developments by increasing-, jshe 
quantity and variety of financial assets, and. the ease with which they, may be 
bought and sold, tend to decrease the asset demand for money. The effect of this 
in a closed economy would be to increase the velocity of circulation and, as summs 
the money stock was independently determined, to cause the price level to be higher 
than it otherwise would be. In an open economy the results are more complex and may 
include some diminution of the. stock of money, or at any rate a diminution of .its 
rate of growth. 
But in a developing economy there is an important factor working in the 
opposite direction to all this. The extension of the money economy creates a 
rising demand for money balances, and by itself this would permit a larger expansion 
of the money stock than would otherwise be consistent with stable prices. This 
trend may indeed counterbalance the effects of changing financial structure, but it 
is impossible to predict in advance what the relative strengths of these two 
developments will be. This uncertainty about major variables in, the system points 
to the need for extreme caution and care in embarking on monetary expansion and., this 
need is underlined by another characteristic of monetary systems. In my view the 
possibilities of wide short-term variations...in the velocity of ci.rQ.ulatib.n„de.velop 
at quite an early stage in the growth of a monetary system. -In a system of any 
maturity - and the East African system is' mature enough - transactions balances are 
rarely near the minimum necessary for comfort, while there always exist considerable 
'savings' balances of money which can be fed into the transactions circuit. This 
variability presents a danger of, instability which would pose a problem of management 
in the context of a reformed monetary system in East Africa. The total effect of 
all these qualifications is, in my opinion, to preclude any automatic programme of 
monetary expansion. Expansion 'will be possible but the•monetary authority will 
have to proceed empirically, with its eye on the immediately visible landscape rather 
than the distant horizon. This conclusion (to which, it must be said, Professor 
Clark himself -gives support) is reinforced by the'consideration that the increases 
in real income, on which the stability of the expansion process depends,-are never a 
foregone conclusion, ....... . . . . . _ 
My second comment on the Lomoro-Clark thesis refers to:. the. external factore 
It is the eternal lot of dependent economies that the scope for independent action 
13 
is narrowly circumscribed..,by the. balance of payments, A high marginal propensity 
to import ensures that any^expansion of money income leads•quickly to a. rise in 
imports which, -unless there is a concomitant rise in exports, or an inflow of 
capital, puts pressure on .the external balance, Now the Lomoro-Clark model strikes 
me as essentially a closed economy model: it makes 110 explicit reference to the 19 
external relations of the system . Its equilibrium criterion is the maintenance 
of stable prices. But in an open economy, under conditions of dynamic growth, a 
18 '• ' . • A'.. -. -
The constricting.effect of the external balance is by no means confined to 
dependent economies, as the British .example shows. 
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stable price level is no guarantee of external equilibrium. Unless, therefore, 
one expects East African'growth to be of the export-led variety, and this seems 
an unlikely prospect, the dependence of continued growth on an unpredictable 
balance of payments" must be recognised. 
Of course it may be said that this throws a pessimistic light on any 
policy for growth, and this is true. Also it has bee'n assumed so far that the 
economy of East Africa will remain substantially 'open' and this is not necessaril 
the policy that will be followed, Eailing a satisfactory development of exports; c 
of other foreign exchange receipts, it may be decided in the interests of faster 
growth to apply a policy of exchange control. Alternatively devaluation of the 
East African shilling might be considered. There would be advantages and 
disadvantages to both these policies and they would have to be weighed in the 
balance with the domestic objectives,, But whatever policy is followed this 
problem of the external limitation must be faced in some way. It may be that 
currently the balance of payments is fairly healthy, but once an expansion rate 
of (say) 5 per cent per annum is established the position could change very 
rapidly, 
4« Money Supply and External Reserves . .. ' ' . •- ; 
My final question is to ask what if any, is the desirable relation 
between external reserves and the internal monetary system in a dependent economy. 
The present currency boaxd system -is characterized by a very close tie-up between 
the two. The practical object of the system is to obviate the possibility of a 
balance of payments problem; or, more precisely, to prevent economic disturbances 
and maladjustments from taking the form of a payments problem. In fact, the 
development of the East African system to 'the point where bank ..deposits are a 
significant form of money, has meant that a deviee for guaranteeing 100 per cent 
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convertibility to the currency cannot do that for the total money stock. However 
no independent monetary system requires a.level of external reserves which 
absolutely guarantees .the convertibility of its total money stock, or of anything 
like it,. The present system of linking the currency and the external reserves. 
19 
Professor Clark does give attention to certa.in aspects of the foreign exchange 
situation in E.D,H,P, 46, but not the ones 'emphasized here. "I must make it clear 
however that in the discussion of iny original paper at Makerere, Professor Clark 
fully endorsed the importance of the external peyncrits factor: -fee difference 
between us was one cf emphasis rather than principle. 
20 " : '••:-"' 
Under the present system a very considerable measure of convertibility is accord 
to bank deposits by the fact that the banks concerned are branches of internationa 
institutions, the head offices of which are able (and so far willing) to support 
their branches in any one territory with resources drawn from elsewhere (c.f. G.Y 
Thomas, ;'The Balance of Payments and Money Supplies of a Colonial Monetary Economy", Social and Economic Studies, March 1963, p,34). This willingness howeve 
may not survive the setting up of a central bank with effective control of all 
external reserves and the more" definite demarcation of the boundaries of the Ear'" African monetary system. 
must be judged on its appropriateness, both technically -ana in terms of the 
r^ eer-ves shich it produces." 
First, the question of the level of reserves. No one, I think, 
would argue that the present system produces an inadequate external reserve. 
Indeed, both Professor Clark and Mr, Newlyn have argued the view, which most 
people would accept, that the level of foi'eign exchange assets imposed by the 
present arrangements is excessive, But this defect could be adjusted relative 
easily by an increase in the.fiduciary element of the currency on lines which 
were explored in the first section of this paper. With a larger, but still 
fixed, fiduciary issue the external reserve would be smaller, but it would still 
be linked at the margin to changes in the currency circulation, Provided we 
admitted the need for some periodical revision of the fiduciary limit to combat 
the -tendency for reserves to become excessive again with the passage of time, as 
the currency grows, this is a perfectly feasible system of linkage between 
money and supply reserves. There is'however, one apparent technical objection 
to it that requires comcnt. 
It may be objected that the linking of researves to marginal changes 
in the currency implicitly recognises the claims to convertibility only of 
currency and not of the other component of the money stock, bank deposits. This 
is valid objection but it can be met by modifying the system to include the 
deposit liabilities of the central ban> vith the' currency in the quantity which 
is linked to the foreign exchange reserve. Then, so long as the commercial 
banks hold balances with the centx-al banks-- and one assumes that in a reformed 
system such balances would replace their present external assets - there would 
be, as it 'were, a formal avenue along which convertibility of bank deposits may 
proceed. This would introduce a certain minor difference into the system; in 
that it would mean that the linkage'between the external reserves and the bank 
deposit component of the money stock would rest on a basis of proportionality 
(through the cash reserve, ratios of the commercial Banks) and not on the one-for-
orre basis governing the currency - reserve linkage. 
But there is a more serious objection to linking external reserve to 
the money stock. It is that the desirable level of external reserves is by no 
means a function of the domestic money supply. . Basically it is the variability 
of the flows of external payments which determines the need for reserves, and 
although the internal monetary situation is one factor affecting these, flows, 
there are. other important determinants. Ideally the need for reserves should be 
determined empirically by observation of the past behaviour of, and present trend 
in, trade, prices and international money flows, 'mwcr, if Boaw simple .inde;c 
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of need is ''sought 'the'-a'bsolute; level' of a1''Countfyrs 'trade is a more suitable 21 . . .. _ quantity to fix on than its domestic money stock," ••-- "- -"•'— "' "'"•'* 
An issue which came up earlier, and which is closely tied up 
with this problem, is that of furnishing suitable restraints on the monetary 
authority. The fact is that the linking of the money supply to external 
reserves does provide a convenient political limitation On the actions of the 
monetary authorities0 Furthermore this lihkage is by no means irrelevant to 
the purposes in view. There is, as I have said, no simple relation between 
the absolute size of the mohey stock and the level of reserves; but there is 
nevertheless some functional connection between changes in these two quantities, 
A rising quantity of money can be a cause of a weakening balance of payments; 
and, while opinions may differ as to its degree'of effectiveness, a compression 
of the money stock is not an irrelevant response to a declining reserve. 
However, these two situations themselves point to a distinction in the'signifi-
cance of a restraint on the money stock, A statutory limitation of this kind 
may aim at preventing inflationary increases in the'money supply; or it may 
have the object of enforcing a particular response - a tight money policy -
in the face of declining reserves. In any giVeii' context a rule of this kind 
may of course have both objectives in view, but: opinion on the effectiveness of 
tiie rule may distinguish between the two. It is a perfectly consistent position 
to hold that a statutory link between money stock and reserves is an effective 
and reasonable means of checking inflationary increases in the quantity of 
money, but that monetary restriction is not an' invariably appropriate policy 
in the face of declining reserve's. 
At this point we should recall a dilemma which we noticed earlier. 
The requirements of domestic monetary policy may call for elasticity in the 
money stock, even in the more limiting context of a dependent economy. But 
it is difficult to meet the need for flexibility and retain the discipline 
of statutory limitations on money supply. However, the very conditions under 
which a dependent economy operates may offer a way'out of this difficulty. 
The speed with which an inflationary internal policy produces an impact on the 
foreign exchange reserve of this type of economy may be such that a statutory 
check, which ideally operates as an advance warning, loses some of its point,, 
21 . . . 
Scitovaky has proposed a measure of desirable reserves based on the 
expendability of cash balances: see ;!Economic Theory and V/estern European 
Integration',' (London, 1958) pp. 101-9. As I interpret it his formula yields a 
measure of the maximum demand for foreign exchange which could arise from a 
given money stock,, The objection to this is that reserves of any kind are 
normally based on probable needs and not on maximum potential needs. Estimates 
of probability in this connection can only be based on past observations. 
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Also it is arguable that the existence of such a powerful 'natural' check 
moderates the need for statutory measure* Possibly the best arrangement is 
to set a low legal minimum ratio of reserves to money stock, to act as a 
'distant' warning and to point the danger into which internal policies can 
lead, but to expect the authorities to operate well above it. This would 
give the necessary elbow room for domestic monetary policy, while the general 
level of the reserve could be attuned to the expected variability of the 
foreign balance. If this appeared to demand an implausible degree of self 
discipline on the part of the monetary authorities then perhaps a more 
complicated system could be devised: for example, one that combined a minimum 
legal ratio of reserves to money supply with, above this, a range of ratios 
within which no increases in the money supply would be permitted. This would 
place some constraints on action but it would avoid imposing inappropriately 
restrictive policies in some situations of external deficit. However, any 
system other than one that completely severed the link between money supply 
and external reserves would require to provide loopholes to meet crisis 
conditions. 
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